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Abstract 
This article explores the ethico-political justifications for hearing the prisoner voice from an 
abolitionist perspective. It starts by locating the interpretation of prisoner narratives within 
the specific moral context of the prison place and moves on to consider whether discourse 
ethics can effectively safeguard the voice of the prisoner. After identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of discourse ethics and their application in liberal penologies, the discussion turns 
to the alternative critical theory of liberation ethics. Enrique Dussel (2013) has argued that we 
have an ethico-political responsibility to not only ensure material conditions are in place to 
facilitate voice but also to adopt the worldview of the powerless. Whilst such a position cannot 
be uncritically accepted, an argument is made for the selective adoption of the prisoner voice 
which is consistent with an abolitionist normative framework promoting emancipatory politics 
and praxis. The article draws to a conclusion by considering normative principles that can 
guide abolitionists when the prisoner voice is silenced. 
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Voice entails the act of speaking and the art of listening. As an expression of our distinctive 
place in the world its acknowledgement is essential for human well-being (Couldry 2010). 
When voice is silenced, speech is disqualified or words invalidated, such refusal can be 
painful and damaging (Scott 2008). Acknowledgement occurs when a person’s self-narrative 
is heard and responded to. From a penal abolitionist perspective, everyone should have the 
opportunity to speak and engage in open dialogue without violence. Doing so can sometimes 
visibilise hidden human experiences, for acknowledgement means to hear the voice of all 
people, including those who are considered radically different or repulsive to us (Cohen 
2001).  
 
The insights of Foucault (1980) on the subjugation of prisoner knowledge are hugely 
influential and the political grounds for acknowledging the world view of the prisoner are 
                                                          
1 The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments on a previous draft of the paper made by the editor 
and two anonymous reviewers. 
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now well established. Over the last four decades, a number of critical criminologists and 
abolitionists, such as Sim (1994), have also pointed to the denial of the prisoner voice and 
championed what is commonly referred to as the ‘view from below’. Abolitionists2 have 
drawn upon the view from below to highlight contradictions between penal policy and 
practice, to illustrate the inherent harms and violence of incarceration, and to highlight the 
limitations of penal reform (Sim 1994). The view from below is especially significant for 
penal abolitionists directly engaged in anti-prison activism in terms of authenticating 
dehumanising realities and generating political momentum. Thus on a theoretical level, penal 
abolitionists question the moral and political legitimacy of the current application of the penal 
rationale and call for alternative ways of handling interpersonal conflicts within a fairer and 
more egalitarian society (Scott 2013). 
 
This article continues in this abolitionist tradition, but rather than constructing a defence of 
the view from below through the politics of prisoner activism or broader social movements, it 
explores the careful and selective adoption of the prisoner perspective on ethical grounds. 
The ethical framework advocated in the article explicitly draws upon the “ethics of alterity” 
(Otherness) as advocated by Levinas (1969) and Dussel (2013). For these thinkers, the ethical 
relationship, that is the people to whom we owe responsibility, arises through face-to-face 
encounters with another person: the other. The “absolute other is the Other […] the Stranger” 
                                                          
2 An ‘abolitionist’ is someone who through either their writing or activism is motivated by the goal of 
abolishing penal repression.  There are three main approaches to abolitionism.  First, some abolitionists aim 
exclusively to abolish certain criminal laws - advocating for example the decriminalisation of drug usage - or 
have focused on the inappropriateness of the punishment of specific populations, such as women, children or 
people with mental health problems.  These abolitionists are known as ‘partial abolitionists’.  Second, a 
number of abolitionists call for the abolition of penal institutions - most notably the prison - as they are 
currently constituted, and these abolitionists are referred to as ‘prison abolitionists’.  Third, a further group of 
abolitionists question not only the state institutions of punishment, but the penal rationale itself.  These 
abolitionists are known as ‘penal abolitionists’. All of these different approaches to abolitionism locate penal 
sanctions within broader social, economic and political contexts and hierarchies of power.  This article is 
grounded in the principles and normative framework of penal abolitionism. 
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(Levinas 1969: 39) – an outsider, a person in need, someone in trouble — and the strongest 
moral claims upon us arise from encounters with the Other (Ibid.). For abolitionists, the 
prisoner is an enforced stranger — the estranged Other — a person forcefully separated from 
family, friends and loved ones. The estranged Other is held in an institutionally structured 
violent context characterised by need deprivation: the prison, a place where voice can be 
manipulated or silenced.  
 
The denial of voice raises profound ethical questions and this article starts by locating the 
interpretation of prisoner narratives within the situational pains and harms of the prison place. 
It then considers whether discourse ethics, a hugely influential critical theory advocated by 
Habermas (1994) and Apel (2001) in the long tradition of the Frankfurt School, can 
effectively safeguard the voice of the prisoner. The discussion then turns to the alternative 
theory of liberation ethics and, drawing upon the insights of Dussel (2013), calls for an 
‘abolitionist ethical hermeneutic’. Taking into account the multilayered ideologies and 
discourses shaping the prisoner voice, this section postulates that an abolitionist ethical 
hermeneutic can contribute towards an emancipatory politics and praxis, albeit one in which 
the interpretation of voice is complicated. Therefore, whilst it is important to listen, to learn 
from prisoners and appropriately respond to their voice, an ethical interpretation also requires 
normative critical judgement taking into account biographical and institutional contexts. 
Consequently, the article explores the criteria upon which the prisoner voice should be 
ethically interpreted and evaluated. The article draws to a conclusion through contemplation 
of some principles that can guide abolitionists when the prisoner is prevented from speaking. 
Penal abolitionism is an ethico-political normative framework, a theoretical perspective, a 
political strategy and a social movement (Scott, 2013). Abolitionists, in various guises, 
provide the intellectual resources for anti-prison activism and contribute to a visualisation of 
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radical alternatives to the penal rationale.  In discussing the ethics of penal abolitionism, the 
article also highlights the importance of direct engagement with prisoners — whether by 
research or political activism (or both) — and the importance of facilitating the voice of the 
‘estranged Other’. 
 
Interpreting prisoner narratives in a situational context 
We never get a ‘pure’ unadulterated voice that stands objectively outside situational contexts 
but rather a culturally mediated representation (Denzin 1989). Voice, and the meanings it 
expresses, derives from biographical experiences in combination with human encounters in 
immediate social settings (Orbuch 1997; Schmidt 2016). Rather than providing an 
unmediated account of the ‘real’, voice inevitably draws upon available “cultural scripts” in a 
given time and place (Smith and Watson 2010: 56). Yet, whilst the prisoner voice is shaped 
through culture and language, it still refers to real circumstances, events and experiences 
(Leiblich et al. 1998; Roberts 2002). When ethically interpreting the voice of the estranged 
Other, we must recognise that prisoner narratives are always positioned within the very real 
context of an institution designed to morally condemn and inflict pain.  
 
The prison is experienced by many as a lonely, isolating and brutalising environment, where 
dull and monotonous routines systematically deprive them of basic human needs (Sykes 
1958; Crewe 2009; Scott 2015a). Prisons create situational contexts denying privacy, 
intimacy or sufficient living space alongside the daily indignity of eating and sleeping in what 
is, in effect, a lavatory (Nagel 1976; Guenther 2013; Scott 2015a). Acute pains are also 
formed through an awareness of ‘time consciousness’, and the resulting sense of loss and 
wasting of life (Medlicott 2001; Scott and Codd 2010). The prison is shaped by a distinct 
morality which is substantially different to that in the outside world. Prisons generate 
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scenarios where prisoners are considered morally unworthy of narrating their lived 
experiences. Distanced and perceived as morally inferior, prisoners, by their very status as 
prisoner, can be denied membership of our common humanity (Scott 2008).  
 
The prisoner label constructs the incarcerated self as a ‘bad person’ who is now defined 
primarily by their ‘crime’ and subsequent punishment. It is likely, then, that a salient factor 
motivating the prisoner voice will be the wish to present a more positive construction of the 
self (Mills 1940; Presser 2004). Pointing to the dehumanising nature and ‘badness’ of the 
penal machine does allow for the assertion of a ‘good’, or at least less obviously spoiled, 
identity as well as articulating the pains of confinement. Yet interpreting the prisoner voice is 
by no means simple. The ‘symbolic violence’ of the prison place can sometimes erase the 
possibility of constructing a ‘good person’ narrative: the prisoner may be so broken by the 
structural and material relations of penal power and the daily degradations of prison life that 
an alternative and positive narrative no longer seems possible (Davies 1990). Alternatively, 
prisoners may come to accept the pain and suffering of the prison place without question as a 
means of accommodating to their circumstances (Schinkel 2014) or start to ‘parrot’ the 
dominant language of the penal regime (Lacombe 2008).3 
 
Penal institutions are conceived to not only constrain the freedom of movement of prisoners 
but also as machines that can write over previous identities and create a new self. At a micro 
level, institutional practices aim to foster an “internalization of ideology and hegemony” 
(Moore and Scraton 2013: 33) as a means of ‘incorporating’ or ‘eliminating’ opposition to 
penal regimes. Prisoners are coached to “tell their stories properly” (Polletta et al. 2011: 15) 
                                                          
3 See also literature in the labelling tradition, upon which Lacombe (2008) draws in her analysis. For a recent 
overview and discussion of the labelling perspective, see Dellwing et al. (2014) The Death and Resurrection of 
Deviance: Current Ideas and Research. 
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and teaching prisoners to reproduce “hegemonic scripts” goes back centuries. Some of the 
first voices to emerge from the convict prisons in England were mediated by prison 
chaplains. For example, in 1853, Chester Castle’s chaplain, H.S. Joseph (1853), published an 
anthology of prisoner narratives entitled Memoirs of Convicted Prisoners.4 The prisoner 
narratives, all extolling the virtues of prisons, were carefully selected to tell a story of 
successful prisoner reformation. Subsequent exposure of the manipulation of the prisoner 
voice, the proliferation of counter-narratives challenging tales of rehabilitation, and the 
generally catastrophic failures of prisons to meet such a goal, has done little to extinguish 
rehabilitative myths.  
 
Prisoner acquiescence and the incorporation of voice to support existing HM Prison Service 
practices fit all of the hallmarks of a hegemonic project (Gramsci 1971). Penal power, it 
would seem, “is at its most effective when least observable” (Lukes 2005: 1), and can 
exclude certain ways of thinking, speaking or acting. This can lead to prisoner voices being 
used to advocate interpretations of prison life which undermine their common humanity. 
Contemporary studies of violent offenders (Fox 1999) and prisoners on sex-offender 
treatment programmes (Lacombe 2008) highlight how prison treatment professionals attempt 
to ‘penetrate the mind’ of prisoners and reconstruct prisoner narratives through the logic of 
cognitive behavioural treatment programmes. The end product is a reassertion of the prisoner 
identity grounded in a ‘pathological self’, but this time created by the internalisation of 
psycho-medical discourses (Scott and Codd 2010). Through speaking such psycho-medical 
language, the prisoner voice provides a new cloak of penal legitimacy rather than 
contributing to an emancipatory praxis.  
                                                          
4 The anthology of Joseph (1853) is considered one of the first publications of prisoner autobiographies in the UK, 
following the introduction of ‘reformed prisons’ earlier in the 1800s. 
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While the prisoner voice may well be easily manipulated, even prisoners expressing 
‘hegemonic scripts’ challenge moral assumptions that their world view is irrelevant, as well 
as giving some control over the representation of their identity. Whatever the difficulties of 
interpretation, the prisoner voice can be a means of expressing human spirit, inspiring 
struggles against dehumanisation and giving ‘witness to oppression’ (Spivak 1988; Gilmore 
2001; Roberts 2002; Smith and Watson 2010). The important thing is to judge not the 
speaker, but what is said. To this end, it is helpful to consider the normative insights of 
discourse ethics as this provides an important element in safeguarding the voices of prisoners. 
 
Discourse ethics 
From the perspective of discourse ethics, all people should be allowed to engage in open 
reciprocal and meaningful dialogue, no matter who they are or what they may have done. The 
validity of voice should be determined through the ‘forceless force’ of rational discussion 
(Habermas 1994; Benhabib 2004), where the better argument wins the debate. In the 
discourse ethics of Apel (2001) and Habermas (1994), respect for, and protection of, 
inviolable human dignity underscore formal processes through which voice is heard. For 
Apel (2001), discourse ethics are universal principles aiming to provide practical procedures 
for how to act in ‘everyday situations’. We should listen to the voices of others, recognise 
their diversity and facilitate their right to define their own reality. To speak is to have an 
opinion heard, to count as a fellow but unique human being (Benhabib 2011).  
 
A number of liberal penological studies have emphasised procedural justice, due process and 
fairness in prisons as means to facilitate the prisoner voice. For such thinkers, prisoners are to 
be treated with respect and their voices are to be heard in an impartial manner (Sparks et al. 
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1996; Liebling 2004). One of the most influential of these proponents is Lord Justice Woolf 
(1991). In his report into prison disturbances in England and Wales in April 1990,5 Woolf 
made a number of recommendations grounded in principles of procedural fairness that appear 
to follow the principles of discourse ethics. Yet his is a consequentialist rather than a 
deontological approach to hearing voice. Woolf (1991: para 14.5) sought procedural justice 
not “for prisoners for their own sakes. To think that would be to fundamentally misconceive 
the argument”. Processes facilitating hearing the prisoner voice were a means to an end: 
prisoner rehabilitation. Further, rather than promoting an unprejudiced listening, Woolf 
maintained that the procedural safeguards for hearing voice were predicated on responsible 
prisoner behaviour. Ultimately, this liberal approach did not value the prisoner voice in and 
of itself, meaning it could be easily dismissed when dissenting against the harsh and brutal 
realities of imprisonment.  
 
Liberal penologies have also been much criticised for neglecting how fairness and procedural 
justice can be undermined by the daily workings of prison life. Having procedures in place is 
one thing, but problems continue if genuine access is obstructed. This is especially the case if 
an authoritarian staff culture is deeply structured within normal daily prison practices, where 
prison officers enforce power relations through discretion and personal authority rather than 
following due process when maintaining order (Scraton et al. 1991; Scott 2006, 2015b). 
Further, there is a tendency for liberal penologies to place too much faith in notions of fair 
procedures (Schmidt 2016). Emphasis on ‘procedural justice’ has meant that alternative 
conceptualisations of justice and ‘just outcomes’ have been inadequately considered in the 
prison place.  
                                                          
5 The prison disturbances in April 1990 were the largest and most prolonged uprisings among prisoners in the UK 
in the last 70 years.  
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Discourse ethics is confronted with some additional serious challenges when considering the 
prisoner voice. Given the nature of prisons, it is almost inevitable that the prisoner will be 
physically and/or structurally prevented from participation in conversations with members of 
the general public and there may be no, or only limited, access to spaces for dialogue with 
debating partners within the prison place. Further, given their socially excluded backgrounds, 
many of those behind bars have found it difficult to perform the “language games” of 
“normal society” (Schmidt 2016). This is unlikely to be addressed in “prison society” as 
“skill comes with practice” and opportunities for developing communication skills are not 
common in the prison place (Ibid.). Nor would discourse ethics automatically raise concerns 
if the estranged Other is only invited to speak through the hegemonic idiom, even though this 
may result in silencing. Alternative means of communication, such as collective prisoner 
protests and individualised forms of resistance and contestation, are unlikely to be interpreted 
as speech acts under the rules of discourse ethics (Scraton et al. 1991). 
 
Through harnessing the principles of mutual respect and cooperation, discourse ethics 
attempts to arrive at a valid, mutually recognised consensus. Yet its predication on equal co-
responsibility for dialogue means that discourse ethics will collapse without reciprocation 
(Apel 2001). Discourse ‘ethics’ also reduces ethics to mutuality alone. As Kropotkin (1923) 
has argued, whilst a political system based upon mutual aid and reciprocation may be the 
preferred option, it is the non-reciprocated act of self-sacrifice for another person that 
signifies true ethics. For Levinas (1969) and Dussel (1985, 1998, 2008, 2013), our ethical 
responsibility exists irrespective of the question of reciprocation. In other words, even if the 
prisoner is disrespectful and fails to engage with us, we should still patiently listen and 
respond when they speak. Reciprocation can lead to unjust compromises where the interests 
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of the powerless are erased in appeasement of the claims of the powerful. Ultimately, we 
must be prepared to surpass reciprocity and procedural fairness in the pursuit of hearing the 
prisoner voice. This means connecting the philosophical insights of ‘liberation ethics’ with 
those of penal abolitionism. This is significant on two levels: first, the ethics of abolitionism 
can be deepened and enhanced through an engagement with the writings of Dussel (2013), 
and second, such an engagement can also indicate the relevance of abolitionist ideas for 
contemporary philosophical debates. 
 
Liberation ethics 
The estranged Other must not be forced to suffer in silence. In fact, recognition of the voice is 
“the first constitutive moment of the ethical process” (Dussel 2013: 52). However, whereas 
discourse ethics represent the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, liberation ethics prioritise 
meeting corporeal need and what Dussel (1998: 13) calls the “paradigm of life”. The 
intention is not to uncover universal, transcendental or abstract principles of dialogue, but to 
understand human existence here and now within its historical, social, political, temporal and 
spatial contexts. For Dussel (2013: 55), whilst the “moral formal principle” of rational 
intersubjective dialogue as developed in “discourse ethics” is necessary, we must first ensure 
that all possible conversational partners have life conditions conducive to human flourishing. 
In other words, human voice is embodied and has corporeal needs that must be met before the 
speech act can be performed. Life must always come before language, for the dead cannot 
speak. Dussel (1998, 2013) refers to this as the “material principle”. Any social or 
institutional structure that creates death rather than life perpetuates need deprivation and/or 
propagates cultural, physical or structural violence; it must therefore be criticised, if not 
abolished (Dussel 1998; Scott 2015a). This has clear implications for the prison place. 
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Ethics has an inevitable social dimension and each person’s individual morality is deeply 
connected with the lives of others. Responsibility for the Other emerges through an 
asymmetrical relationship: that is, an encounter with someone who is less powerful than us. 
We cannot in good conscience turn away from those in need, those who are suffering, those 
facing trouble, trauma or torment. We have an ethical responsibility. This responsibility is not 
reciprocal or mutually reinforcing, but an obligation that is owed. In this power/responsibility 
axis, therefore, people in positions of power have a responsibility not to assist themselves but 
to respond to the call of the Other. This means, then, not just having processes in place to 
facilitate the prisoner voice, but acknowledging and responding appropriately to that voice. 
The voice of the estranged Other demands our attention because we are “impelled by an 
ethical duty” through a “co-responsibility” for their life and well-being (Dussel 2013: 285, 
emphasis in original). Indeed, a transformative logic lies at the heart of the ethical 
relationship: there is an ethical responsibility to work towards the emancipation of the Other 
who is excluded, marginalised and exploited, whoever they may be. This is not to sidestep 
significant difficulties regarding what an individual’s a priori needs entail — the contingency 
of human experiences or problems concerning how the imposition of normative values can 
create paternalism — but rather to emphasise the importance of facilitating and hearing (an 
imperfect) voice in the first instance, so that further negotiations can be entered into 
regarding the meeting of genuine human need.6  
 
There is, then, an ethico-political responsibility to liberate the Other from authoritarian 
domination, violence, and false hierarchies of power. For a clean “ethical conscience” 
                                                          
6 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising the important tension in the writings of Dussel (2013) 
with those of the sociological insights of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) The Social Construction 
of Reality and its application in this article.  Alongside the points raised in the text, there is the difficulty of 
differentiating between needs and wants — which, again, emphasises the point of negotiation — and the ever-
evolving notion of ‘necessary needs’, in which human needs reflect the socio-economic conditions of a society at 
a given historical moment. 
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(Dussel 1985: 59), we must demand an end to injustice and participate in the struggle towards 
rebuilding destroyed human lives. This means challenging institutionally structured practices 
of violence, social death and abandonment (Stauffer 2015; Scott 2015a). We should always 
recognise and respond to the pain and suffering of the powerless. The voice of the estranged 
Other must be heard, even if they cannot speak the ‘language of the system’ or understand the 
conversational nuances of the hegemonic idiom (dominant way of speaking). When the 
estranged Other does speak (for the very appearance of the face of the estranged Other 
automatically starts a dialogue), we must patiently listen. Their voice must not be 
automatically disqualified from democratic dialogue. There are, of course, difficulties in 
interpreting voice, but the ethical impulse is clear: we must allow the prisoner to speak. 
 
Abolitionist ethical hermeneutics 
The ethics of liberation are an ethics for a world characterised by social injustice. Given the 
deep fault lines around ‘race’, gender, sexuality, age, (dis)ability and class in advanced 
capitalist societies, the ethics of alterity are undoubtedly the ethics for our historical 
conjuncture. The existence of people excluded from democratic dialogue poses a significant 
challenge to any consensus. Their voices have not been heard. They have not participated in 
any new agreement. As such, there is an ethico-political responsibility to search out and 
acknowledge voices that are denied, silenced or ignored. In other words, an ethical 
responsibility to hear and understand the voice of the Other.  
 
But Dussel’s ‘ethical hermeneutics’ goes further than this. It also means attempting to 
interpret the world from the perspective of the estranged Other (Dussel 1985; Barber 1998). 
For Dussel (1985, 2013), assuming the voice least likely to be heard is the only way that we 
can rationally guarantee that all views will be considered in a dialogue between 
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conversational partners. As a result, ethical interpretation will become attuned to the 
domination, exploitation and repression silencing the Other. Despite its merits, there can then 
be no uncritical adoption of Dussel’s formulation of ethical hermeneutics in the prison place. 
Interpretation is especially challenging in an institution designed to manipulate voice through 
the logic of rehabilitative programmes and/or the moral discourse of less eligibility (Scott 
2006; Lacombe 2008). Yet the potential significance of a modified ‘abolitionist ethical 
hermeneutic’ is undoubted: through a careful and selective adoption of the prisoner 
worldview will never lose sight of the (currently often unacknowledged) suffering of the 
estranged Other (Cohen 2001; Scott 2015b). 
 
Solidarity with sufferers entails patient, respectful and careful listening (Dussel 1998). 
Ethical dialogue should begin with the voice of the estranged Other, and listeners have a 
responsibility to both acknowledge what is said and to learn from it (Ibid.). Ethical 
hermeneutics requires us to undertake a “pedagogic apprenticeship” (Barber 1998: 53) with 
the estranged Other, and slowly but surely develop new understandings of their and our 
worlds. This would mean having a sensitivity and appreciation of how penal power shapes 
the prisoner voice, but also recognition of how prisoners can subvert such power (Scraton et 
al. 1991). Developing this kind of awareness is key for such an apprenticeship. Our ears must 
become habituated to the language of the Other and our eyes to what they see, so we can be 
educated by them (Dussel 1985). What had previously been hidden or invisible may be 
revealed through their words. We can start to glean new knowledge from the margins about 
daily lived reality: 
 
One who lives out the ethos of liberation locates herself in the ‘hermeneutic 
position’ of the oppressed and takes on their interests, thereby discovering 
previously unnoticed values and emphases and opening the horizon of the 
possible constitution of objects of knowledge often invisible to those 
ensconced within the Totality. (Barber 1998: 69) 
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Attuning our ears in such a manner means being prepared to hear stories and accounts that 
may challenge our pre-existing understandings of the world (Stauffer 2015). Hearing the 
voice of the estranged Other must be rooted in a genuine openness and engagement with what 
is said about the harmful situational contexts of the prison place and the exercise of penal 
power.  
 
Despite its merits, there can then be no unmodified translation of Dussel’s call to assume the 
worldview of the least powerful in the prison place.7 Ethical interpretation is especially 
challenging in an institution designed to manipulate voice through the logic of rehabilitative 
programmes and/or the moral discourse of less eligibility (Scott 2006; Lacombe 2008). But 
an ethical hermeneutic also entails listening to what remains unsaid (Ibid.). Prisoner 
worldviews may also be profoundly conservative or discriminatory. The potential, though, of 
a modified ‘abolitionist ethical hermeneutic’ is undoubted: through a careful and selective 
adoption of the prisoner worldview, sight will never be lost of the (currently often 
unacknowledged) suffering of the estranged Other (Cohen 2001; Scott 2015b). But alongside 
silencing and denial always sits the institutionalised manipulation of the prisoner voice. 
Consequently, ‘what is said’ must always be open to critical evaluation. 
 
Critical judgement 
                                                          
7 This point is anticipated by Dussel (2013: 239, emphasis in the original), who argues that “something that the 
ethics of liberation has always clearly understood: The situation of the [oppressed] is not a guarantee of 
understanding either […]  This is why it is necessary to accept that the victims themselves, alone, cannot carry 
out a sufficiently analytical and explanatory criticism against the system: The theoretician, whose activity consists 
of accelerating developments that might lead to a society without injustice, may find himself in opposition to 
opinions that prevail [...]  If such a possibility of conflict did not exist, theoretical work would be unnecessary 
[…] The mission of the critical theorist is to reduce the discrepancy between his comprehension and that of 
oppressed humanity for which he thinks”. 
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The ethical relationship between the self and the Other is a dialogue rather than a monologue 
(Dussel 2013). The call of the estranged Other should initiate a response, but there remains a 
requirement for critical judgement. An abolitionist ethical hermeneutic champions the 
emancipation of the powerless, dominated and repressed, and attempts to understand the 
world from their marginalised perspective. But there is no guarantee that listening to the 
prisoner voice will automatically lead to greater enlightenment: the estranged Other may 
endorse or exaggerate discriminatory ideologies such as racism, sexism and homophobia. The 
prisoner voice must also be understood within the multilayered discourse and ideologies that 
permeate the prison place. Penal power is expressed through rehabilitative programmes and 
moral discourses that have the explicit purpose to transform the self. Such hegemonic 
practices and ideologies can manipulate and transform the prisoner voice into the service of 
penal authorities. Abolitionist ethical hermeneutics (the ethical interpretation) must always 
then evaluate the prisoner voice while considering its consistency with the normative 
principles of human rights, social justice and democratic accountability (Scott 2013, 2016).  
 
Critical judgement is not judgemental. Judgementalism is quick to blame and condemn, is 
certain of itself, willing to quickly dismiss the views of the Other, and draws upon negative 
stereotypes (Gaita 2002). Critical judgement is its inverse. When hearing a person give their 
own self-narrative, the listener’s moral judgement is suspended. When we do judge we must 
do so with great care, compassion and considerable reluctance (Ibid.). Critical judgement 
should be made in the interests of the Other rather than the self. This means two things for an 
abolitionist ethical hermeneutic. First, that we should be prepared for self-critique in response 
to the voice of the estranged Other and second, if we do criticise their voice, we do so for 
them. We are called to engage in a dialogue with the Other, and a reluctant, but critical, 
appraisal of their words, actions and beliefs is part of that ethical responsibility. The ethical 
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demand arising through an encounter with the face of the estranged Other is the start of a 
rational dialogue. We should listen and learn, but may also be compelled to disagree. When 
the estranged Other espouses views that perpetuate or would create injustice they should be 
challenged (Sim 2003). There must then be a careful and selective approach to the prisoner 
voice, one which is sensitive to the way in which voice is situated within the ideologies and 
discourses of the prison place. Interpretation of prisoner voices also requires reflection on the 
subject position of the abolitionist, whether as activists, theoreticians or researchers, 
something which is discussed further below.  
 
Abolitionist ethical hermeneutics require only that the voice of the estranged Other is heard, 
not that it dominates proceedings or is considered unproblematic. The ethical responsibility is 
to facilitate a rational dialogue, not create ‘epistemic privilege’. The difficulty with 
‘epistemic privilege’ is that in privileging a particular person or group at the expense of all 
others, any statement by them is impervious to critique. It cannot be challenged as nobody 
else is qualified to comment. “Unwelcome knowledge” (Cohen 2001) about the inherent 
harms and violence of imprisonment can come from many different sources. Those who have 
knowledge should be given the opportunity to speak, whoever they are. The responsibility is 
to ensure the inclusion of the voice of the estranged Other at the start of the communication 
process, not to thoughtlessly follow their views.  
 
We should always be unwilling judges, constantly questioning our right and competency to 
do so, and open to amending our decision. We should make judgements from below, 
alongside, together and with others, but perhaps most significantly of all we must primarily 
judge to prevent injustice. Equally importantly, an ethical judgement should never in itself 
lead to further manifestations of injustice (Dussel 2013). Critical judgement should then 
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aspire to deliver justice. We should therefore be offended by unjust practices which 
dehumanise, threaten dignity and destroy the world. This means judging social structures and 
institutions which result in the ruination of a person’s body, mind and soul. A just judgement 
acknowledges the Other’s common humanity (Gaita 2002). If we have to judge voice it 
should not be the speaker, but the strength and rationality of what is said (Apel 2001). 
Critical judgement should be linked with interventions promoting the “paradigm of life” 
(Dussel 2013) and be in the service of an emancipatory politics aspiring to deliver justice for 
all (Alcoff 1995; Dussel 1998; Gaita 2002). 
 
When the estranged Other cannot speak 
But what should abolitionists do if the estranged Other cannot speak? Can it ever be 
appropriate to speak for the prisoner? Hegemonic forms of cultural and political 
representation can directly exclude the prisoner from speaking, manipulate voice so that it 
reflects hegemonic penal constructions of reality or morally condemn them as unworthy of 
being heard (Foucault 1980; Spivak 1988; Scott 2008). The way the prisoner communicates 
may not be understood by the hegemonic “master discourse” (Dussel 1985). The prisoner 
may not understand or adhere to the dominant idiom of the speech act. They may 
communicate in a different idiom: prisoners may speak but not find themselves widely 
understood (Spivak 1988). The problem is that speaking on behalf of the marginalised and 
excluded could, paradoxically, facilitate the silencing of voice (Spivak 1988; hooks 1991). 
The estranged Other is ‘ventriloquized’ by a more privileged speaker, which does nothing to 
disrupt existing hierarchies of power (Spivak 1988; hooks 1991; Alcoff 1995). As such, 
speaking for others “is arrogant, vain, unethical and politically illegitimate” (Alcoff 1995: 
97–8). Therefore, the question of whether the abolitionist (certainly as a political activist) 
should speak for the Other must always be a “second order question” (Ibid.). First, the 
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abolitionist must help the prisoner give their own account, something that may be a necessary 
part of the healing process (Scarry 1985). 
 
Deliberately ignoring voice is linked to the exercise of penal power. The views and opinions 
of prisoners can be deemed invalid or illegitimate. Those in positions of penal power define 
and set parameters on what can be said and who can speak (Foucault 1980). For knowledge 
to be utilised, the ‘knower’ must establish a right to speak, for acceptance of any given 
statement is often linked to the status of the speaker. Not all voices are heard and not all 
speakers are viewed with the same standing or invested with the ability to provide a 
legitimate interpretation (Foucault 1980). In the ‘view from above’ (official discourse), the 
prisoner voice can be reduced to a ‘subjugated knowledge’ that is either entirely neglected or 
discredited (Ibid.). For example, in the Keith Report investigating the death of Zahid 
Mubarek,8 the author declared that “[i]nvariablly what the prisoner says is not reliable […] 
There is no reason to suppose that prisoners always tell the truth when asked” (Keith 2006: 
500). The moral condemnation associated with the prisoner label systematically undervalues 
voice and blocks self-narratives, denying the estranged Other a platform from which to speak 
(Foucault 1980; Scott 2008; Couldry 2010). The prisoner can be silenced because they cannot 
“register a sovereign speech act” (Spivak 1988) or are unable to denote who they are in the 
existing structures of representation (Ibid.). 
  
But this is not the whole story, for prisons are world-destroying places. Prisons create not the 
‘paradigm of life’ but pain, suffering and civil, social and corporeal death (Scott 2015a). 
Human life is largely about building meaningful and fulfilling relations with other humans, 
                                                          
8 Zahid Mubarek was a young Asian prisoner who was killed in Feltham Young Offender Institution by his 
cellmate Robert Stewart — a known racist — on 21March 2000. Following a long legal battle by the Mubarek 
family, a public inquiry into his death was ordered, which was headed up by Mr Justice Keith.  
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but the prison place individualises and undermines our intersubjectivity, not only by 
removing people from previous relationships but by creating a type of social death that 
prevents the formation of new life-affirming relationships (Kropotkin 1923). Voice is “co-
authored”, and only reveals its true meaning and importance in conversation with other 
people (Stauffer 2015). To have voice is to be part of a wider community, to engender 
feelings of belonging, trust and security. Prisons unmake lifeworlds. That is, the concrete 
social relationships and interpersonal connections with other human beings that provide the 
foundations for our identity and being-in-the-world start to unravel, and such unravelling can 
lead to the collapse of the self. The denial of voice combined with social abandonment (social 
death) results in a new and profound sense of anguish, existential crisis and “ethical 
loneliness” (Stauffer 2015: 1). Not hearing the voice of the estranged Other, failing to 
respond to a cry of pain, matters enormously to those who are not heard because the sense of 
abandonment impacts upon how the past resonates in the present and how they face the 
future. To feel intense pain is to be overwhelmed in the present and to experience the past as 
alien and “unfathomable” (Scarry 1985). 
 
The pain and suffering generated through penal incarceration can destroy the capacity to 
speak (Stauffer 2015). At times, human suffering is “unsharable” (Scarry 1985: 4). The 
sufferer, who no longer has the words to express what they are feeling, is silenced, made 
invisible and denied full participation in the human community (Ibid.). An abolitionist ethical 
hermeneutic, therefore, also entails listening to what remains unsaid (Stauffer 2015). Some 
things cannot be said without revealing weakness. Sometimes the truth is so horrible that it is 
best left unsaid (Ibid.), but other times the denial of voice can only exacerbate injustice.  
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Talking about suffering may also be so disturbing that it silences others. Listeners may 
become illiterate and unable to understand or acknowledge what the prisoner has told them 
because they do not understand the extent or meaning of the pain described (Ibid.). The Other 
is muted. There does not necessarily have to be the intention to deliberately silence the 
estranged Other. It is that we just do not always know how to hear the voice of the Other. The 
hegemonic idiom does not understand when the estranged Other speaks (Spivak 1988). It is 
penologically illiterate and ignorant of the Other. It needs educating. 
 
None of this means that abolitionists should never speak on behalf of the estranged Other. 
What it does suggest, though, is that the prisoners should not be forced to follow the language 
rules of the hegemonic discourse. Nor should they be silenced (Dussel 1998). If the prisoner 
does not know the hegemonic idiom, or the hegemonic idiom does not understand the 
prisoner, the abolitionist must attempt to act as interpreter. The abolitionist, especially one 
who has served their ‘pedagogic apprenticeship’, has a responsibility to understand, placing 
even greater emphasis on careful and patient listening and the interpretation of voice within a 
complicated prison situational context. Sometimes what is being said is not clear. Sometimes 
nothing can be said. Sometimes no one can speak. Who, then, hears the voices of prisoners 
with serious mental-health problems, the dead or dying, the d/Deaf, the foreigner who does 
not speak the national language of the prison service, or those in solitary confinement denied 
contact with another person? Who will speak for them? How can their voices be heard? 
 
Six conditions of speaking  
For Spivak (1988), intellectuals must find a balance between listening and responding to the 
voice and participating in a dialogue that does not result in the paralysis of the Other’s ability 
to speak or be heard. Though reluctant speakers, there are certain “conditions of dialogue” 
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(Alcoff 1995: 110) that, when all else fails, allows speech on behalf of prisoners. Detailed 
below are six such conditions drawing on the insights of Alcoff (1995: 110–113). 
 
1.  Fight against the impetus to speak. The first priority always must be to hear voice. 
The speech act is legitimate only if prisoners have been prevented from speaking or 
are struggling to articulate their own experiences, such as the largely invisible harms 
of institutionally structured violence.  
 
2. Not silencing the Other. Abolitionists should ensure their speech act does not silence 
prisoner voices. Their narrative should draw either implicitly or explicitly upon the 
experience, actions or words of the estranged Other. Questions should be raised about 
the absence of the actual prisoner voice, and their presence championed. Speaking for 
must be an act of last resort. 
 
3. Acknowledge a privileged speaking position. The abolitionist should make their 
privileged identity and subject position clear from the outset. This means 
acknowledging their own social background, status and political ideals. It should be 
made obvious that the speech act derives from their speaking position, not that of the 
estranged Other. The abolitionist should speak with great care, utilise rigorous 
scholarship and draw upon the words of prisoners as faithfully as possible. 
 
4. Take responsibility for the Other. The abolitionist should speak on behalf and for the 
estranged Other. The speech act of the abolitionist is in place of silence. Speaking is 
an act of responsibility for the estranged Other. Abolitionists should speak only when 
nobody else can or will speak with such ethical responsibility.  
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5. The emancipatory objective of speaking. Abolitionism is a form of emancipatory 
knowledge challenging injustice, need deprivation and the state manufacture of 
suffering and death. The speech act should stimulate a counter-hegemonic narrative 
visibilising the pain, suffering and lived experiences of the prisoner. It should aim to 
facilitate emancipatory politics for the estranged Other and to promote broader values 
and principles of social justice. 
 
6. Self-silencing. Abolitionists cannot bring closure to dialogue about the estranged 
Other. As reluctant contributors, they should always be open to critique and a 
“counter-narrative” or “counter-sentence” by the estranged Other (Spivak 1988).  
 
 
Legislators and interpreters 
Abolitionist ethical hermeneutics facilitate the prisoner voice, carefully listening to what is 
said and (under certain conditions) engaging in dialogue with and alongside the estranged 
Other about the realities of prison life. Abolitionists must not be silent but rather should speak 
with responsibility. They should be both interpreters and legislators. As interpreters, 
abolitionists should help translate the idiom of the estranged Other for a wider audience. 
Alongside engineering a platform for the prisoner voice, abolitionists should help those who 
have limited penological literacy to understand the prisoner’s lifeworld and what it means to 
see the world through their eyes. This means also acknowledging how the prisoner voice can 
be manipulated as well as silenced. There is an art to listening and interpreting the prisoner 
voice. It is as important that the hegemonic idiom changes its way of hearing and listening to 
the estranged Other, as it is for the estranged Other to engage in the hegemonic idiom of 
rational discourse. As Stauffer (2015: 8, emphasis added) has argued: 
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It will be important for those who listen to reflect on the limits to what they 
already know and how that affects what they are able to hear. Perhaps then 
people and the institutions they design will be able to listen for their own 
failures — and thus begin to live up to what justice […] or long-standing 
injustice demands.  
 
 
We need more pedagogical apprentices ‘learning to learn’ from the voice of the estranged 
Other. But abolitionists should also be legislators. Abolitionists should deploy their critical 
judgements and normative frameworks to critique unjust institutions of domination and 
repression. They should do so also to challenge discriminatory stereotypes, including those 
expressed by prisoners. Interpreting the prisoner voice can be difficult and so must always be 
contextualised within a broader commitment to emancipatory politics and praxis. Voices 
should be judged drawing upon an abolitionist normative framework grounded in the 
principles of social justice, human rights and democratic accountability (Scott 2013, 2016). In 
times of great social injustice, there must not be silence, nor only a small number of voices 
considered suitable to speak on injustices, but rather an open dialogue fostering 
transformative and emancipatory change, visualising real utopian ‘life affirming’ alternatives 
to the penal rationale and promoting new visions of justice for all.  
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